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ABSTRACT: Copyright protection extends to “original” works.  The 
adjective “original” here means a work that originated with its 
purported author, and is not meant to impute any novelty 
requirement to copyright law.  However, case law and literature 
offer up several odd examples where two individuals have 
independently created identical works of art.  The theory 
underlying copyright law requires that, because each work 
originated independently from separate authors, each work be 
independently copyrightable.  Applying this strict, objective 
standard of originality to the transformative arts, we begin to 
see new possibilities for grounding copyrights in parodies and 
satires.  Under current law, parodies escape infringement of 
their target works through the “fair use” exception to copyright 
law, while satires frequently do not.  However, this essay 
argues that, under a strict interpretation of the originality 
standard, parodies and satires alike can be considered 
independently created works of art that are not derivative of 
(and hence not infringing) their target works.  This essay 
suggests the application of a new standard of ascertainably 
different meanings when determining whether one work infringes 
upon a similar work.
ARTICLE:
Protecting Menard’s Quixote: A Return to the Strict Originality 
Standard in Copyright Law
Central to the issue of copyright protection is the 
question of originality.1  U.S. law protects “original works of 
authorship” but little is done to define this phrase.2  Taken in 
its barest form, a work is original if it originated with its 
purported author.  Case law shies away from judging the 
creativity inherent in a work, and imposes a more “objective” 
standard of originality.  But this objective standard has some 
surprising consequences when taken to its logical limit.  The 
1
 Howard Abrams, Originality and Creativity in Copyright Law, 55-SPG Law & 
Contemp. Probs. 3, 6.
2
 17 U.S.C.A. §103(a)
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admittedly extreme cases discussed below force us to reexamine 
our notions of authorship and originality.  Properly understood, 
these two notions suggest that derivative works such as parody 
and satire may best be considered not as fair use “exceptions” 
to copyright law, but (in appropriate cases) as original works 
of authorship protected in their own right.  To that end I argue 
that, in addition to considerations of similarity and access, 
courts should consider evidence of independent meaning to 
determine when a work is original.  
Case One: Hand’s Magical Poet
Copyright inheres in “original works of authorship”, and 
much hinges upon the definition of “original”.  Does the word 
define a work that possesses “novelty or freshness of style or 
character”?3  Or does it merely mean “made, composed, or done by 
the person himself”?4  The first case we shall consider was put 
forward in a famous thought experiment by Learned Hand.  “[I]f 
by some magic a man who had never known it were to compose anew 
Keats's Ode on a Grecian Urn, he would be an ‘author,’ and, if 
he copyrighted it, others might not copy that poem, though they 
might of course copy Keats's.” 5
The implications of Learned Hand’s words are quite 
puzzling.  First, that someone might by mere accident stumble 
3 Oxford English Dictionary, “Originality” 2.a.
4 Oxford English Dictionary, “Original” 4.b.
5 Sheldon v. Metro-Goldwyn Pictures Corp., 81 F.2d 49, 54 (2nd Cir. 1936).
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upon the very words used by Keats is so improbable as to be 
absurd.  But, granting this unlikelihood, more absurdity 
follows: Learned Hand suggests that this serendipitous poem 
could be copyrighted as a work somehow distinct from Keats’s, 
even though the two poems might be word-for-word identical.  
Though Keats’s poem, being in the public domain, might be freely 
distributed on the internet, the new poem is protected.  Of 
course, this raises the question: how are we to ascertain 
whether a particular copy is attributable to Keats or to Hand’s 
magical author?  But this question leads us down the wrong path, 
Hand seems to suggest: the objective originality of a work may 
not always be easy to establish, and may not present us with 
copyrights that are easy to enforce, but it provides us with the 
philosophical basis and constitutional justification for our 
copyright system.
The result may seem counter-intuitive.  Imagine entering a 
bookstore to find a newly published copy of Jurassic Park, 
written by Hand’s magical author.  The author had been stranded 
on a deserted island since 1982, and had, by an incredible 
chance, written a novel word-for-word identical to Michael 
Crichton’s famous book.  Under U.S. Patent law, the inventor of 
a device is protected against those who later create the same 
device independently.  However, there is no such protection 
under U.S. Copyright law.  In this odd situation, Michael 
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Crichton has no cause of action—legally, his copyright has not 
been infringed. 
What is the likelihood of “accidentally” recreating 
Jurassic Park?  The answer, of course, is smaller than 
miniscule.  As David Nimmer notes, “sorcery aside, people do not 
adventitiously come up with original works mimicking the full 
text of great romantic poems.”6  Nevertheless, to say the event 
is incredibly unlikely is not to say that it is impossible.  If 
someone were to publish an adventitious Jurassic Park, the 
courts (and the literary world) might have a hard time believing 
that the work was original—but this is a question of fact.  The 
question of law is straightforward: if it is found to be 
original, the adventitious Jurassic Park does not infringe.7
Hand’s thought experiment cuts to the heart of copyright: 
it is not novelty that qualifies a work for copyright 
protection, but the “reach[ing] into the subjective range of 
interiority, thereby producing words … fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression.”8  This phrase, suggested by David Nimmer, 
plays an important role in what follows, so an understanding of 
its meaning is crucial.  The subjective range of interiority 
6
 David Nimmer, Copyright in the Dead Sea Scrolls, 38 Houston Law Review, 1, 
39.  
7
 It is amusing to imagine the copyright problems that would arise over the 
serendipitous Jurassic Park.  While Crichton could license the movie 
rights of his novel to Universal, the adventitious author could 
legitimately license the rights of his novel to Sony.  Or, he could 
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consists of the mental, and some might say spiritual, life of an 
individual.  It is necessarily subjective, since only the 
individual has access to it.  It consists, in part, of an 
individual’s feelings, beliefs, ideas, emotions, vague 
sensations, and half-baked notions.  To dive into this realm 
and, influenced by what is there, return with a fixed, objective 
expression of the objects of this metaphysical realm, is to 
become an author.
Copyright protects only against “copying”, and courts 
wisely note that an independent creation is not a copy.9  Hand 
himself implies that Keats’s Ode and the later Ode are actually 
two different poems, and suggests that copyright protection is 
available for the latter, but not for the former, public domain 
poem.10
How can two poems that are word-for-word identical be 
different?  The most straightforward answer is, because the two 
poems have different origins.  Works of art (protectable ones, 
at least) are expressions, and expressions must, by definition, 
be expressions of some agent.11  Keats’s Ode is an expression of 
Keats’s subjective range of interiority, while the Ode written 
underbid Crichton, causing Universal to buy the rights to his novel 
instead of Crichton’s.
8
 Nimmer, supra, at 39.
9 Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54, Feist Publications Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 
U.S. 340, 362 (1991).
10 Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
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by Hand’s author is an expression of his subjective range of 
interiority.  It is because each poem originates with different 
authors that each poem is original.
The same cannot be said of a pirated Ode.  When I 
plagiarize Keats, the result of my plagiarism cannot be said to 
be an expression of my owns ideas and experiences—my own 
subjective impressions.  Rather, my plagiarized poem remains an 
expression of Keats’s subjective realm.  
A difference in origin is one crucial difference between 
Keats’s poem and the poem by Hand’s “magical” author.  There may 
be another difference.  Though the forms of the two poems happen 
to be identical, their intended meanings need not be.  For 
example, though each poem uses the phrase: 
“Thou still unravish’d bride of quietness,
Thou foster-child of silence and slow time,”12
Keats may have meant to express admiration for the enduring 
beauty of art, while Hand’s fortuitous composer may have felt 
frustration at art’s inability to capture the ever-changing 
vagaries of life.  This difference in intended meaning arises 
due to the difference in origin; in other words, the meanings of 
the poems differ precisely because the poems are expressions of 
differing subjective impressions.  Of course, the average reader 
11
 More precisely: Expression, II.2.a. “The action of expressing or 
representing (a meaning, thought, state of things) in words or 
symbols;” Oxford English Dictionary.
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may not pick up on such differences, but literary critics often 
consider the social contexts and life experiences of authors 
when interpreting a work.  Critics may analyze the two poems 
quite differently, depending on the contexts of the authors’ 
lives.  
It is important to emphasize that a text is not by itself 
an expression, and alone it is no more deserving of copyright 
protection than an idea.  Underlying copyright law is the divide 
between syntax and semantics, between form and content.  A work 
of authorship is created not merely by typing words on a page, 
but also by attributing meaning to those words.  A monkey does 
not become an author merely by punching keys on a typewriter, 
even if the monkey miraculously manages to type out coherent 
sentences.  And in just the same way, a drunken blind man 
pounding wildly on a keyboard is not authoring anything.  To 
qualify as an author, one must at least have an intent to 
express a subjective internal state.13
Of course, form and content must both be present for a work 
to receive copyright protection; neither one is protectable 
independently.  Usually, the emphasis is placed on the “form” 
requirement: an idea alone (i.e., content without form) cannot 
12
 John Keats, Ode on a Grecian Urn, in The Odes of John Keats, p. 114 (Helen 
Vendler ed., 1983).
13
 Nimmer, supra, at 204-205.  “Intent is a necessary element of the act of 
authorship,” (emphasis in original).
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be copyrighted.14  But the “content” requirement exists as well: 
a random or arbitrary series of symbols cannot be protected.15
The juxtaposition of words can express an idea, but it doesn’t 
necessarily do so: the mere alphabetical ordering of telephone 
listings is not copyrightable expression, since there is no 
content to be expressed.16
Why does a fortuitous Jurassic Park, written by Hand’s 
magical author, fail to infringe upon Michael Crichton’s 
copyright?  To sum up, the two novels originate from separate 
attributions of intended meaning to a set of symbols placed on a 
page.  To create an “original work of authorship,” an individual 
must (1) select the symbols to be included in the work, and (2) 
intend that the symbols have a meaning or effect, that emerges 
from the individual’s subjective range of interiority. 
Case Two: Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote
The second case is described in great detail by Jorge Luis 
Borges in his short story Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.  
14
 In order for an author to “infringe” upon Shakespeare’s character of Sir 
Toby Belch, “it would not be enough that for one of his characters he 
cast a riotous knight who kept wassail to the discomfort of the 
household….These would be no more than Shakespeare’s ‘ideas’ in the 
play, as little capable of monopoly as Einstein’s Doctrine of 
Relativity.”  Nichols v. Universal Pictures Corp., 45 F. 2d 119, 121 
(2d Cir. 1930).
15
 “Mitel’s arbitrary assignment of particular numbers to particular functions 
and its sequential ordering in registers and descriptions ‘lack[] the 
modicum of creativity necessary to transform mere selection into 
copyrightable expression.’”  Mitel, Inc. v Iqtel, Inc., 124 F.3d 1366, 
1374 (10th Cir. 1997), quoting Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.  See also Stuart 
Ent. Inc. v. American Games Inc., Civil Action No. 1-96-CV-70036 (S.D. 
Iowa Mar. 19, 1998), denying protection to the design of Bingo cards, 
as described in Nimmer, supra, at 31.  
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Menard, an obscure (and fictitious) French author living at the 
turn of the century, had the “admirable intention … to produce a 
few pages of text which would coincide—word for word and line 
for line—with those of Miguel de Cervantes.”17  After years of 
effort and draft after draft of text, Menard managed to produce 
“the ninth and thirty-eighth chapters of the first part of Don 
Quixote and a fragment of chapter twenty-two.”18
What was Menard’s “admirable intention”?  To copy Don 
Quixote?  If so, why did it take so much time and effort, so 
many thousands of torn up pages, to replicate such a small 
amount of Cervantes’s text?  And why does Borges call this work 
“perhaps the most significant of our time”?19
Borges is quick to point out that Menard “never 
contemplated a mechanical transcription of the original; he did 
not propose to copy it.”20  Rather, Menard proposed to “reach the 
Quixote through the experiences of Pierre Menard.”21  Menard 
intended to write his own novel, stemming from his own life 
experiences and social context—from his own subjective realm of 
interiority.  He wanted to convey his own unique outlook and 
16 Feist, 499 U.S. at 362.
17
 Jorge Luis Borges, Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote, in Labyrinths, 
p.39 (Donald Yates, ed. 1964).  There is most certainly a distinction 
to be drawn between Borges the author and Borges the narrator/critic of 
the story.  However, since the distinction is irrelevant in the present 
context, I shall ignore it.
18 id., at 39  
19 id., at 38-39.
20 id., at 39.
21 id., at 40.
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perspective on life.  But he wanted to see if he could express 
his unique perspective using the very same words the Cervantes 
used centuries before.  In Menard’s own words, “[m]y solitary 
game is governed by two polar laws.  The first permits me to 
essay variations of a formal and psychological type; the second 
obliges me to sacrifice these variations to the ‘original’ text 
and reason out this annihilation in an irrefutable manner.”22
Menard’s text derives its meaning entirely from his own 
subjective experience23; this is the point of his first law, 
which all authors employ.  “To essay variations of a formal and 
psychological type” is the first step in writing anything; it is 
practically synonymous with Nimmer’s concept of “reach[ing] into 
the subjective range of interiority.”24  All authors will 
consider many different ways of expressing a particular feeling, 
idea, or aesthetic impression, before settling on the phrase 
that best captures the author’s fancy.  
The second law is meant to be a formal limitation upon the 
first, and it can be considered in two parts.  The first part 
“obliges [Menard] to sacrifice these variations to the 
22 id., at 41.  Note Borges’s use of scare quotes around the word “original”.  
Borges recognizes (as does the fictional Menard) that both Quixotes
are, in fact, originals; despite their identical formal structures they 
are different works.
23 We will assume this is true, for it is what Menard sought to achieve.  Of 
course, it is possible that he cheated, but we will for the time being 
put our faith in his integrity, and put off our skeptical demands for 
proof until the fourth section.
24
 Nimmer, supra, at 39.
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‘original’ text.”25  Menard uses Cervantes’s text not as the 
basis for his original expression, but as a constraining force, 
much like a poet may voluntarily limit her own creativity by 
employing the traditional rhyme and meter constraints of the 
sonnet form.  Menard’s use of the “Quixote form”, so to speak, 
does not facilitate or contribute to Menard’s expression; in 
fact, it makes Menard’s ability to express himself almost 
infinitely more difficult.  
Consider, as an analogy to Menard’s endeavor, that of an 
author attempting to write a novel in palindrome form.  Even the 
most dexterous of authors can compose no more than a dozen or so 
tortured lines of palindrome; a novel-length palindrome would be 
an enormous undertaking.  If such a novel would be gripping, 
insightful, and instructive as well, the accomplishment becomes 
even more astonishing.  Each sentence the author adds to her 
artistic expression must be carefully calculated to be 
comprehensible forward and backward, and to contribute to the 
story in both directions.  This substantial limitation to the 
author’s artistic expression never determines that expression, 
though it does tightly constrain the author’s choices.  In a 
similar way, Menard’s constraint does not determine his 
expression; the choices he makes are his own, and must be 
25
 Borges, supra, at 41.
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“reason[ed] out … in an irrefutable manner.”26  This is the force 
of the second part of the law.
That Menard succeeded—even for just a chapter or two—in his 
goal is amazing.  Menard was able to express his views on life 
in the twentieth century; he was able to generate, from his own 
subjective realm of interiority, the same words used by 
Cervantes three hundred years before.  No longer should we be 
surprised by the “draft upon draft”, or the “thousands of 
manuscript pages” Menard tore up before achieving this small 
part of his goal.27  The words must come, as it were, from his 
soul; they must genuinely be all and only the words he would 
have chosen to convey his insights and perspectives; and they 
must be the same symbols used by Cervantes three centuries 
before.  Had Menard merely copied Cervantes’s Quixote, he would 
have had much less difficulty; the ratio of effort expended to 
goals achieved is commensurate with what we would expect from
the difficulty of Menard’s task.  Indeed, if anything about 
Menard’s Quixote is surprising, it’s not that he wrote so little 
but that he wrote so much.
This is what allows Menard to claim (portions of) the 
Quixote as his own: the independent and meticulous attribution 
of meaning, of content, onto a particular formal combination of 
26 id., at 41. 
27 id., at 44.
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symbols on a page.  Menard’s Quixote and Cervantes’s Quixote
constitute different “expressions of ideas” precisely because 
they are the expressions of different ideas.28  And, as in the 
case of Keats and the magical poet described above, the 
difference in meaning is ascertainable through the different 
contexts of their lives and cultures.  For example, Chapter 
Thirty-Eight (of both Quixotes) “treats of the curious discourse 
of Don Quixote on arms and letters,”29 and Borges writes: 
[i]t is well known that Don Quixote…decided the debate 
against letters and in favor of arms.  Cervantes was a 
former soldier: his verdict is understandable.  But that 
Pierre Menard’s Don Quixote—a contemporary of La trahison 
des clercs and Bertrand Russell—should fall prey to such 
nebulous sophistries!”30
Borges concludes that the seeming anomaly must be attributed to 
“the influence of Nietzsche.”31   We see here a clear example of 
the meaning to the works being shaped by the context in which 
they are written.  Elsewhere, Borges quotes the following 
passage from part one, chapter nine of Don Quixote:
…truth, whose mother is history, rival of time, depository 
of deeds, witness of the past, exemplar and advisor to the 
present, and the future’s counselor.32
28
 More precisely, they are different works because of the different origins 
of their meaning.  Had Menard’s Quixote had a meaning identical to 
Cervantes’s, though still derived from Menard, the works would still 
have different origins.  Indeed, Menard contemplates (but ultimately 
rejects as uninteresting) a method aimed at replicating Cervantes’s 
meaning.  Borges, supra, at 40.  
29 id., at 42.
30 id., at 42.
31
 id., at 42.
32 id., at 43.
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Borges dismisses Cervantes’s passage as “a mere rhetorical 
praise of history.”33  But of Menard’s corresponding (some would 
say, identical) passage, Borges writes,
History, the mother of truth: the idea is astounding.  
Menard, a contemporary of William James, does not define 
history as an inquiry into reality but as its origin.  
Historical truth, for him, is not what has happened; it is 
what we judge to have happened.  The final phrases…are 
brazenly pragmatic. 34
Indeed, so drastic is the difference between the two works that 
Borges finds Menard’s Quixote to be qualitatively superior: 
subtler, more profound, and more artistically accomplished than 
the textually-identical work by Cervantes.  “Cervantes’s text 
and Menard’s are verbally identical, but the second is almost 
infinitely richer,”35 we are told, and Menard’s Quixote is 
“interminably heroic,” “peerless,”36 and “astounding.”37
Menard has created two chapters of text, sometimes critical 
of contemporary society, sometimes insightful of the human 
condition, sometimes ironically subverting readers’ 
expectations.  The work is the result of years of careful 
craftsmanship and continuous revision.  The text is, 
intentionally, word for word identical to chapters of Miguel de 
Cervantes’s Don Quixote, but Menard takes great care not to 
borrow any of Cervantes’s expression.  Cervantes never places 
33 id., at 43.
34 id., at 43.
35 id., at 42.
36 id., 38.
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words in Menard’s mouth, so to speak; the phrases Menard uses 
are carefully chosen to express Menard’s subjective impressions,
chosen according to rules that force Menard to reason through 
every decision independently.  Menard’s first rule of 
construction allows him to contemplate many possible alternative 
phrases to express his ideas.  His second rule of construction 
forces him to “irrefutably” justify the selection of one phrase 
over possible alternatives.  Together, these rules ensure that 
each turn of phrase contemplated by Menard during the writing of 
the novel originates from his own subjective realm of 
interiority.  Menard does not “recast” Cervantes’s Quixote in 
some other form; his goal is to create another Quixote, by 
carefully assigning meaning to form without being influenced by 
Cervantes’s prior assignations.  Menard’s work is the expression 
of his views, his attitudes, and the context of his environment—
an expression that originates wholly from his own subjective 
impressions and experience.  
It may, of course, happen that some phrase or sentence 
expresses the same meaning in Cervantes’s Quixote and in 
Menard’s.  This is not problematic: so long as Menard has 
followed his two rules, the correspondence in meaning between 
the two expressions will truly be fortuitous.  The 
37 id., 42.
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correspondence was not necessary, but the contingent result of 
two independent assignments of meaning to text.
Menard’s Quixote is unique in the annals of literature, and 
it is not surprising that we do not have a name for it.  I will 
coin the somewhat oxymoronic term “independent recreations” to 
refer to art that, while formally identical to pre-existing art, 
nevertheless originates from the artist’s “subjective realm of 
interiority.38
How can U.S. Copyright law deal with Menard’s two-plus 
chapters?  To make the issue more pressing, imagine again that 
instead of Don Quixote, Pierre Menard writes Jurassic Park, 
chapter for chapter, word for word.  Would Michael Crichton have 
a cause of action now?  Before you respond, reconsider the 
lessons of the previous section: if the assignment of meaning to 
chosen symbols originates from the subjective impressions of the 
author, then it is an “original work of authorship.”39
The Supreme Court has held that “[o]riginality does not 
signify novelty; a work may be original even though it closely 
resembles other works so long as the similarity is fortuitous, 
not the result of copying.”40 The Feist Court and Learned Hand 
both provide a rudimentary guide for assessing originality: 
38
 We can imagine other possible “independent recreations,” such as William 
Faulkner’s Huckleberry Finn, James Joyce’s The Gospel According to 
Luke, and Kurt Vonnegut, Jr.’s Pierre Menard, Author of the Quixote.
39 See p. 7, infra
40 Feist, 499 U.S. at 345.
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fortuitous similarity is original, but copying is not.  But both 
Courts fall prey to a false dichotomy: they assume that 
“resemblance through chance” and “resemblance through copying” 
exhaust the reasons why two works may resemble one another.  As 
we have seen, Menard’s Quixote fits into neither category.  
Unlike Hand’s “magical author,” Menard is well aware of 
Cervantes’s Quixote—in fact it is Menard’s intention that his 
text be identical with Cervantes’s.  At the same time, Menard’s 
Quixote is not a transcription, reproduction, or copy—it is a 
new work painstakingly crafted by Menard, the creative 
expression of his unique perspective and social context.  Again, 
as I have argued, Menard’s turns of phrase are chosen not for 
their formal identity to Cervantes’s work; indeed, Menard’s own 
rules force him to ignore this fact.  Instead, Menard selects 
symbols in order to express ideas that are at times shockingly 
different from the ideas expressed by Cervantes.  Menard may be 
justly accused of reinventing the wheel, but “reinvent” the 
Quixote is exactly what he did; he did not copy it. 
Justice Hand writes that an author “is not a tortfeasor 
unless he pirates his work.”41  Menard meticulously avoids 
incorporating Cervantes’s expression into his own writing, while 
operating under enormous formal constraints—pirates seldom work 
so hard.  Menard’s Quixote is original in the sense that his 
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expression—his use of formal elements to convey content—
originated from a reaching into his own subjective realm of 
interiority.  It is original, too, in that his artistic 
expression is distinguishable from Cervantes’s.  His is an 
original work of authorship cognizable under traditional 
copyright law.
But does Menard’s Quixote qualify as a derivative work?  If 
so, then regardless of its originality and meaning, it infringes 
upon the work from which it derives.  Though the question of 
derivative works appears different from the question of 
originality, they are in fact identical.  It is expression that 
merits copyright protection—not text, nor meaning, but the use
of text to convey meaning.  I may write a novel exploring the 
same themes and messages as To Kill a Mockingbird—this in itself 
is no infringement.  Harper Lee’s copyright prohibits me from 
copying his expression—in other words, I cannot use Lee’s “form” 
to explore Lee’s “content”.  This is the rationale behind 
Holmes’s declaration that “[o]thers are free to copy the 
original.  They are not free to copy the copy.”42  Holmes 
suggests that while I may paint my own portrait of Whistler’s 
mother, I may not paint a portrait of Whistler’s Mother.43  If I 
41 Sheldon, 81 F.2d at 54.
42 Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239, 249 (1903).
43
 That is, I may not paint a version of Whistler’s artistic expression, 
though if I happen to arrive at a similar expression through my own 
marriage of form to content, then this is unobjectionable.
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use new form to convey Lee’s ideas, the result is new expression 
and is protectable.  But I may not use a new form to convey 
Lee’s expression.  For example, I may not translate To Kill a 
Mockingbird into German, or write a sequel.  Such a work would 
be not an expression of an idea, but an expression of an 
expression—a copy of a copy.  And such a work is derivative of 
the original.  But Menard’s Quixote is not an expression of 
Cervantes’s work.  It is not even an expression of Cervantes’s 
ideas.  It is an expression of Menard’s own subjective 
experiences and impressions.
To examine the question from another angle, consider the 
definition of a derivative work contained in the 1976 Copyright 
Act: “A ‘derivative work’ is a work based upon one or more pre-
existing works.”44  Is Menard’s Quixote “based on” Cervantes’s 
work?  Menard’s two rules of composition prevent him from 
relying upon Cervantes’s Quixote either to determine the 
subjective content of his expression or to choose the particular 
form of that expression.  Cervantes’s work provides the space 
within which Menard’s expression can occur, but it does not 
directly influence Menard’s expression itself.  Menard’s work is 
no more “based on” Cervantes’s than every modern sonnet is 
“based on” the Shakespearean prototype.  
44
 17 U.S.C.A. § 101.
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Let’s not be blind, however, to the irony of Borges’s 
story.  Menard’s goal was quixotic—an impossible dream.  He “set 
himself to an undertaking which was exceedingly complex and, 
from the beginning, futile,” understanding that he “should…have 
to be immortal to carry it out.”45  We needn’t worry about any 
independent recreation knock-offs of John Grisham books hitting 
the market soon—the likelihood of even Menard’s partial success 
is infinitesimal.  But consider the lessons learned:  Similarity 
between artistic expressions is not a matter of mere form, but 
of the way in which the formal elements are used to convey 
semantic content.  And an intention to achieve formal similarity 
with another artistic expression does not by itself constitute 
piracy.  These twin concepts will carry us some distance in our 
consideration of the more common cases of parody and satire in 
the next section.
Parody and Beyond
As mentioned above, I may write a new novel expressing the 
ideas explored in Harper Lee’s To Kill a Mockingbird.  Might I 
not alternatively use the icons, the symbols, and the other 
formal elements of Lee’s novel to explore different themes and 
messages?  Isn’t this also to create an expression different 
from Lee’s?
45
 Borges, supra, at 40, 43-44.
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This is the controversial question central not only to 
parody, but also to satire and to many of the appropriation 
arts.  Unlike our “intentional recreations,” both parody and 
satire have only a partial similarity to elements of an earlier 
text.  But, as with Menard’s Quixote, the similarity is highly 
intentional.  
Courts tend to agree that parody, a time-honored form of 
expression,46 should be protected and encouraged as “promoting 
the progress … of useful arts.”47  But under current case law, 
judges assume that parodies and satires are derivative works and 
focus on determining whether they fall under either a “free 
speech” or “fair use” exception to copyright infringement.  
Parody is generally found to constitute a “fair use” exception 
to infringement, while satire is not.
Under current case law, important to a determination of 
fair use is a work’s “function” or “purpose”.48  Parody mimics an 
earlier work with the purpose of criticizing or commenting upon 
that work, whereas satire mimics an earlier work to criticize or 
comment upon society in general.  Moreover, “[p]arody needs to 
mimic an original to make its point, and so has some claim to 
use the creation of its victim’s…imagination, whereas satire can 
stand on its own two feet and so requires justification for the 
46 Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569 (1994).
47
 U.S. Const, Art I, § 8, cl 8.
48 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 574.
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very act of borrowing.”49  To criticize a work, the parodist must 
make use of that work; but to criticize society, the satirist 
may make use of any number of works.  Complicating any judicial 
standard is “the fact that parody often shades into satire…, or 
that a work may contain both parodic and non-parodic elements.”50
Even when a work is perceived to be a parody, its license 
to use elements from the earlier work is not unlimited.  Under 
current standards, even when a work is deemed to have a parodic 
purpose, a further question must be asked: whether the parodist 
has appropriated more of the parodied work than was necessary to 
achieve the parodic purpose.51  In addition, courts look to the 
“substitution effect”, or the degree to which the alleged parody 
may prove to be a market substitute for the original.52
But remember: our invented genre of independent recreations 
did not require an “exception” to copyright law in order to gain 
protection.  The theory underlying copyright law naturally 
extends protection to independently-created artistic 
expressions, so long as they are “expressions of ideas” and not 
“expressions of expressions.”  No consideration of critical 
purpose, of amount of material copied, or of market substitution 
is needed to ground protection in Menard’s hypothetical Quixote.  
49 id., at 574.
50 id., at 574. 
51 id., at 574.
52 id., at 574.
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Rather, Menard’s Quixote is the result of Menard’s “reach[ing] 
into the subjective realm of interiority,”53 “essay[ing] 
variations of a formal and psychological type,”54 and selecting 
from among these variations “in an irrefutable manner.”55  Can 
simple parody similarly be understood as a “partial independent 
recreation”?  Can parody be reconceptualized as a non-infringing 
original work of authorship rather than as a non-original 
exception to infringement law?
To begin, let’s define a “simple parody” as a work using 
formal elements of a target work solely in order to criticize 
that target work.  Imagine a parody of Jurassic Park; instead of 
Professor Hammond, the greedy theme-park loving mastermind of 
genetic reconstruction, we are presented with Professor 
Crichton, a greedy, Hollywood-loving pop writer.  His goal is 
not to recreate living dinosaurs, but to create digital 
dinosaurs on film.  He enlists the aid not of Ian Malcolm and 
Dr. Alan Grant, but of Steven Spielberg and writer David Koepp.  
Spielberg and Koepp warn Crichton that his obsession with 
digital dinosaurs will wreak havoc with the things that should 
truly be important to him—things like character and plot.  But 
Crichton heedlessly rushes forward with his insane plan.  He 
discovers to his dismay that he is unable to control his digital 
53
 Nimmer, supra, at 39.
54
 Borges, supra, at 41.
55 id., at 41.
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dinosaurs, and they break loose not to maim and kill, but to 
steal scenes and ham it up in front of the camera.  Spielberg, 
Koepp and Crichton barely escape the film with their 
professional careers intact.
Now I’m being needlessly harsh on a perfectly fine popcorn 
movie, but I do so to illustrate the workings of parody.  As 
with intentional recreations like Menard’s Quixote, my simple 
parody is intended to be similar to its target.  The Jurassic 
Park parody would not be word-for-word identical with the 
target, and would only partially mirror that text.  The non-
mirroring elements of the parody originate unproblematically 
from my own subjective realm of interiority.  The important 
question is, have I “copied” the mirroring elements from 
Crichton’s Jurassic Park?  Or have I “independently recreated”
them?
The answer to this question cannot be found through an 
examination of the formal similarities alone.  Both Crichton’s 
work and my parody are expressions (i.e., both use form to 
express meaning); copyright law protects them as such.  If I can 
“irrefutably justify”56 my selection of formal elements (or 
justify them sufficiently to satisfy a civil burden of proof), 
then I can establish that my parody is an expression of my own 
56 id., at 41.
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subjective impressions, and not a derivative expression of 
Crichton’s impressions.  
How might I justify my selection of formal elements?  I 
must point to the meaning, apparent and intended, underlying my 
use of similar elements.  By showing that my use of the formal 
elements carries a significantly different meaning than that 
intended by Crichton’s use, I establish that the two expressions 
have different origins.  By selecting Crichton to stand in for 
Hammond, I imply that Crichton’s motives for writing are driven 
by an obsession for fame and fortune.  Spielberg and Koepp 
become the voices of reason, cautioning him against ignoring the 
artistic needs of his narrative.  The scene-stealing dinosaurs 
are the fulfillment of this danger.  While the elements found in 
Crichton’s work are intended for narrative effect, the similar 
elements found in my simple parody are intended to be critical 
of Crichton’s endeavor—and they are readily understood as such.  
The fact is, I do not rely upon Crichton’s expression: it 
neither determines my selection of formal elements, nor does it 
drive my assignment of meaning to those elements.  All this is 
done by reaching into my own subjective realm of interiority.  
Of course, but for Crichton’s work, my parody would not exist; 
then again, but for Shelley’s Frankenstein, Doyle’s The Lost 
World, and copyrighted works by Bradbury, Asimov, and Clark, 
Crichton’s book would not exist.
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As I have illustrated, the simple parodist does not express 
the target author’s expression.  A key to determining this fact 
is that the meaning conveyed by the parodist’s use of form is 
quite distinct from the meaning conveyed by the author of the 
target work.  A character in the target work may represent 
strength and nobility, while a similar character in the simple 
parody is constructed to convey something quite different: often 
a disgust with the target character, or a skewering of his 
values and ideals.  This difference in meaning provides evidence 
that the two expressions are distinct.  Simple parodies 
generally constitute original works because the critical meaning 
of the mirroring elements originates with the parodist, in spite 
of the intended similarity of those elements.
A simple parody is the clearest example of a partial 
independent recreation.  Most perceptive readers readily 
understand the difference in meaning between my parody and 
Jurassic Park.  How much of the target work may I imitate in the 
parody?  The answer to this question is simple: as much as I 
have “independently recreated”.  In other words, the parodist 
should be allowed to use any and all formal elements that she 
can truly claim to have instilled with independent meaning.  An 
extremely talented parodist may be able, like Menard, to produce 
a parody that is word-for-word identical with the target work.  
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(Like Menard, however, she should be prepared to justify the 
similarities “in an irrefutable manner”57 before a judge.)  
Where does this standard fit into traditional infringement 
analysis?  Independent meanings of expressions relate both to 
the similarity of works and to their originality (or “origin”).  
Two expressions conveying different meaning are not “the same”, 
even when the formal elements of the expressions are similar; 
this is true of the dueling Odes, the dueling Quixotes, and the 
dueling Jurassic Parks.  Consequently, courts should consider 
not similarity of formal elements alone, but similarity of the 
expressions as a whole.  
Of course, when adopting a rule to guide judges and 
litigants in infringement cases, we cannot turn a blind eye to 
issues of practicality.  While Learned Hand has set forth the 
general principles of originality in all their shining 
theoretical purity, judges are not philosophers and need 
something more earthy.  This does not mean, however, that the 
theoretical basis of the originality standard should be left out 
entirely.  In most infringement cases, a prima facie case for 
infringement would still be made out based upon the common 
criteria of similarity and access: given the relative 
unlikelihood of encountering independently created Odes or 
Quixotes, proof of access and similarity can justifiably give 
57 id., at 41.
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rise to an inference of pirating.  Evidence for independent 
meaning then becomes critical as a defense to piracy, in 
determining whether the allegedly infringing work nevertheless 
constitutes an independent creation.58  The parodic expression 
(appropriately understood as the use of form to express content) 
will be deemed to originate with the parodist exactly when the 
connection of form to content derives not from the target work 
but from the subjective experiences of the parodist.
Some commentators have argued that the primary theoretical 
justification for parodies lies in their critical meaning.  
This, in a sense, is exactly the case.  But not, as these 
commentators suggest, because criticism constitutes a free use 
exception to infringement (though it, doubtlessly, does).  
Rather, parodies’ use of critical meaning (in place of the 
meaning intended by the target author) is an instance of 
“independent meaning” which more broadly distinguishes original 
from derivative works.  
Simple parodies are, of course, not the only partial 
independent recreations.  The partial intentional recreation 
model also provides a good framework for assessing more complex 
works.  The Supreme Court acknowledged in Acuff-Rose that works 
often contain both parodic and non-parodic elements.59  When 
58
 The burden of proving independent meaning may fall upon the parodist here.
59 Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 581.
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should such works be considered original artistic expressions?  
The same standard is employed: when the author has used the 
similar elements to convey a meaning independent of the meaning 
conveyed in the target work.  Independent meanings imply 
independently derived expressions, and so long as the 
“independent meaning” condition is met, the work counts as 
original, non-derivative artistic expression.
Note that, in theory, this criterion does not require that 
the meaning of the partial independent recreation be different 
from the meaning of the target work; it must only be 
independently derived.  In certain cases, determining the 
independent origin of meaning may be quite difficult, requiring 
testimony from the authors and, perhaps, expert testimony from 
literary critics or theorists.  For many other cases, though, 
the standard is quite straightforward: if the meanings of the 
two expressions are different, they must have independent 
origins.  In simple parodies, for example, the meaning attached 
to the formal similarities found in the parody involves 
criticism of the target text.
In this way, the desire to protect the venerable parody is 
reconciled with copyright theory; no “exceptions” are required.  
Parody, as a partial independent recreation, is entitled to 
protection as an “original work of authorship”.  Note, however, 
that my standard for analysis is in some respects stricter, and 
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in other respects more lenient, than current law.  As discussed 
above, the parodist must justify any use of similar formal 
elements through the assignment of independent meaning; the 
parodist may never rely upon the target author’s expression to 
derive the meaning of her text.  In this way, my proposed 
standard is harsher than the current standards governing parody, 
which don’t require such “irrefutable” justifications once a 
parodic purpose has been ascertained.  In yet other ways, the 
independent meaning standard is more expansive.  Parodists are 
not limited to the minimum use of similar elements required to 
achieve parodic effect; rather, they may “use” as little or as 
much as they assign independent meaning to.60  Also irrelevant 
under the independent meaning standard is any consideration of 
the “substitution effect” mentioned above.
But more significantly, the independent meaning standard 
extends protection to categories of art not traditionally 
protected by the court.  Consider another Jurassic Park
scenario: the obsessive mastermind this time is not John Hammond 
but George W. Bush, and his insane plan is to recreate dinosaurs 
in order to increase the United State’s supply of fossil fuels.  
Expecting eco-friendly shills Al Gore and Ralph Nader to support 
his plan to resurrect these extinct species, he’s surprised to 
60 Technically speaking, under my interpretation the parodist doesn’t “use” 
the original work at all, except as a formal constraint on his 
creativity.
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find they object to his continued reliance on oil to solve 
America’s energy crisis.  
This Jurassic Park is not a parody; it does not comment on 
Crichton’s work.  It is, instead, a social satire, lampooning 
the ideological values of conservative Republicans.  As a 
satire, it is not protected under current U.S. law.  Parodies 
need to use stylistic elements of Jurassic Park to criticize the 
work itself; but courts find that in the case of satire, the use 
of a particular work is more arbitrary.61  The satirist could 
have easily chosen Don Quixote, or Hamlet, as his vehicle of 
satire.62
But if our standard is to be the independent attribution of 
meaning to form, then the Jurassic Park parody is scarcely 
distinguishable from the Jurassic Park satire.  Both originate 
through the independent attribution of meaning to form, as 
indicated by a readily discernable difference in meaning between 
the two works and their target.
How far does the new standard go?  Does it apply to a work 
that has no perceptable critical intent—either literary or 
social?  Imagine I write a book about a crazed 
61 See Acuff-Rose, 510 U.S. at 580-581, Rogers v. Koons, 960 F.2d 301, 310 (2d 
Cir. 1992).
62 Of course, if the artist’s purpose is, for example, to criticize the 
shallowness of contemporary American art, he is arguably confined to 
using a copyrighted piece of contemporary American art as his vehicle.  
The particular piece selected may be arbitrary, but in order to express 
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entrepreneur/scientist John Hammond, who creates an island theme 
park filled with genetically-reconstructed dinosaurs that 
proceed to run amuck and wreak destruction on a cast of 
characters.  It’s not word-for-word identical with Crichton’s 
novel, ala Menard’s Quixote, but I claim to have attributed 
meaning to my characters, setting, and plot points independently 
of Crichton.  I claim my work to be an expression of my own 
subjective realm of interiority.  Is my work protected under the 
proposed standard?
Yes and no.  The response to this question is complex.  In 
theory, the standard is the independent attribution of meaning 
to text.  If my neo-Jurassic Park is independently derived, as I 
claim, then it qualifies for protection under the standard in 
theory.  But the standard in practice is more limited.  Using an 
independently derived meaning standard as I propose, as a 
defense to piracy, requires a showing of an ascertainable 
difference in meaning, under the assumption that such a showing 
is objective evidence of the independent attribution of meaning.  
My neo-Jurassic Park may possess an independent attribution of 
meaning, without possessing much ascertainable difference of 
meaning.  Thus, the standard in practice does not protect me 
from Crichton’s infringement claim.
the artist’s subjective impressions, someone’s copyright must be 
sacrificed—a fact that the Court fails to address in Koons below.
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In other words, whether the allegedly infringing elements 
of my work possess an independent attribution of meaning is a 
question of fact to be decided by the Court.  The facts that my 
novel is similar to Crichton’s, and that I had prior access to 
Crichton’s work, count as evidence against independent 
attribution of meaning; the presumption swings against me.  In 
the absence of readily discernable differences of meaning, the 
only evidence in my favor is my own claim of independent 
meaning.  But this claim is suspect, not only on the grounds of 
bias and credibility, but also because an author is not 
infallible in determining the source of his attribution of 
meaning.63  Literary theory has long recognized that what the 
author intends, and what the author thinks he intends, may be 
two separate things.
Does the independent meaning standard allow traditionally 
derivative works?  Most derivative works are straightforwardly 
derivative.  Sequels and spin-offs rely upon the earlier 
expression to provide content for the later expression—a 
character’s traits or past, a world’s political or social 
structure.  Films and dramatizations are explorations of the 
content present in the original work.  Derivative works are 
63 George Harrison had a good-faith belief that “My Sweet Lord” was the 
product of his own subjective realm of interiority, though the court 
later determined he had been subconsciously influenced by the song 
“He’s So Fine.”  Bright Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 
420 F.Supp. 177 (D.C.N.Y. 1976).
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continuations or extensions of the author’s earlier expression; 
their meanings, and their forms, derive from the initial works.  
Some works, though, blur the line between “derivative” and 
“original”; and unfortunately, the independent meaning standard 
advocated here does not draw clear lines for judges.  Can a T.V. 
commercial incorporate copyrighted material?  Can a new film 
incorporate the plot from an old book?  Can a rap song use the 
melody of an old love ballad?  The answer is left to the 
discretion of the finder of fact: if an independent attribution 
of meaning is found, then the work may be deemed a non-
infringing independent creation.  But more is required than the 
mere façade of meaning, a post hoc rationalization of piracy.  
The expression must not hitch itself to the meaning of the 
earlier text.
If the line is not clear to judges, it is also not clear to 
authors.  At the very least, authors are on notice that any 
intended similarity to existing copyrighted works must be 
justified in Menard’s “irrefutable manner.”  But while authors 
are thereby subject to heightened scrutiny by judges, they have 
a certain degree of added freedom.  Writers of satire, and 
appropriation artists who work by transforming existing art, 
have some claim of right to their art, under the independent 
meaning standard.
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To a large degree, a standard of ascertainable differences 
in meaning coincides with the standard of the transformative 
value of a work laid out in Acuff-Rose.  Of course, the Court’s 
decision merely enhanced the importance of the transformative 
value of a work in determining whether it involved a fair use 
exception to copyright law.  I urge the adoption of a more 
powerful standard that directly addresses the issue of the 
originality of a text: the independent attribution of meaning to 
form constitutes the separate, non-infringing origin of a work.
The Independent Meaning Standard Applied
The facts of Rogers v. Koons are this: a visual artist 
appropriates the image of a couple with their puppies.  He 
transforms the image into a three-dimensional sculpture, with 
some alteration.  The sculpture is intended to convey 
exasperation and bewilderment at the banality of middle-class 
American culture and sensibilities—and most observers understand 
the sculpture as such.  The sculpture has taken on a different 
significance: the independent meaning behind the artist’s use of 
the form is clear.  The photographer of the image sues alleging 
infringement.  What result?64
The Court in Rogers v. Koons rejects the theory that such a 
sculpture constitutes a “fair use” exception, since it is satire 
64 Koons, 960 F.2d at 301.
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and not parody.65  Koons need not have chosen that particular 
image to convey his message of disgust.66  Perhaps the Court is 
correct to deny that Koons’s “String of Puppies” is a fair use 
of Rogers’s photograph.  But the lesson of Menard’s Quixote is 
that the Court never should have gotten as far as a 
consideration of fair use.  Koons’s sculpture should qualify 
under copyright law as an independent and original artistic 
creation.  It is the result of his use of particular formal 
elements to express his own independently derived subjective 
impressions.  His application of meaning to the formal elements 
of Rogers’s photo is evident to most observers, and independent 
of any meaning Rogers himself intended to convey.  This 
simultaneously indicates the independent origination of Koons’s 
expression, and establishes a fundamental dissimilarity between 
the two works.
Although the independent meaning standard requires some 
subjective artistic discernment on the part of the finder of 
65 id., at 310. “The problem in the instant case is that even given that 
"String of Puppies" is a satirical critique of our materialistic 
society, it is difficult to discern any parody of the photograph 
"Puppies" itself.”  Interesting in Koons is that the Court hits upon a 
crucial issue, but fails to explore it thoroughly: “in looking at these 
two works of art to determine whether they are substantially similar, 
focus must be on the similarity of the expression of an idea or fact, 
not on the similarity of the facts, ideas or concepts themselves.”  
Koons, 960 F.2d at 308. However, the Court envisions an “expression” 
as merely the formal elements of the work, divorced from the idea it 
expresses.  Such an interpretation of the word “expression” forces a 
conclusion that Keats’s Ode and the Ode created by Hand’s author are 
identical.
66 id., at 310.
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fact, such subjective discernments are already required in the 
current case law regarding fair use, where judges must decide 
upon the “purpose” and “nature” of the allegedly infringing 
work, as well as the amount of borrowing “required” to achieve 
parodic effect.  Though copyright law has trended toward the use 
of objective measures, subjectivity continues to seep into 
judicial opinions.  This fact is hardly surprising; it would be 
more surprising to find a completely objective standard that 
addressed all aspects of copyright theory satisfactorily.  After 
all, artistic expression is the subject of copyright law, and it 
is inherently and irreducibly subjective.  
Conclusion
It is important to recognize the distinction between the 
meaning of the text and the text itself.  Neither alone 
constitutes artistic expression; the act of aligning meaning 
with form is required.  This is the very definition of the word 
“expression”.
Most cases of clear infringement involve the replication of 
both text and meaning.  But where text and meaning diverge, 
analysis of infringement must proceed with great care.  Works 
with textual similarity to prior works may nevertheless be 
original works of authorship recognizable under copyright law.  
The telling question that must be answered to determine 
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infringement is, whether the assignment of meaning to form is 
the independent, subjective work of the putative author.
While the absence of ascertainable differences of meaning 
does not by itself indicate a lack of originality, the presence 
of ascertainable differences of meaning is indicative of a 
different source of origin.  Independent meaning is one factor 
that should be given important weight in determining the 
originality of a work.
The use of an “independent meaning” standard to determine 
when a work is original requires a change in the current 
conception of copyright.  The standard extends protection to 
satiric works and even serious works, so long as the use of 
similar elements is accompanied by the expression of independent 
meaning.  Extending protection to such works promotes the 
“Progress of Science”, as transformative works continue to add 
new ideas and perspectives to our collective social dialogue.
